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Abstract
Capability-passing processes model global applications in a way that decouples the global agree-
ment aspects of protocols from the details of how the communications are actually made. It relies
on a restricted API or programming language and on the exchange of digital certiﬁcates repre-
senting capabilities to ensure that participants are faithful to a protocol and that outsiders cannot
interfere. At the speciﬁcation level, protocols are reasoned about independently of the underlying
communication, using a process calculus with an abstraction of logs to isolate the remote state
required for such protocols. At the implementation level, protocol steps no longer perform global
communication; instead capabilities are used to transmit evidence of remote state, which in turn
are used to authorize local log changes (corresponding to protocol steps). In this way, an API for
global agreement protocols is deﬁned independently of the underlying communication system.
Keywords: distributed systems, global agreement, atomic commitment, process calculus.
1 Introduction
Global distributed applications must deal with the fact that the Internet, and
other networks, are increasingly becoming discrete address spaces, delineated
by ﬁrewalls, network address translation, independent failures etc. Fig. 1(a)
describes the current state of the art in distributed computing; the typical
protocol stack includes a network layer for routing, a transport layer for reli-
able communication, and an application layer. The lower layers of this stack
are complicated by the increasing sophistication of the network environment
[10] and are starting to creak under the strain of these additional demands [6].
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Fig. 1. Structuring protocol layers in global computing
We propose a system in which, instead of the protocol primitives com-
municating directly, processes pass proofs of their capabilities between each
other. There are two key advantages to this approach. The ﬁrst is that the
user can control how these capabilities are passed between sites, and so nav-
igate any particular network obstacles that the protocol system may not be
aware of, such as NAT, VPNs, faulty connections, disconnected nodes etc.
The second is that by separating the agreement parts of a protocol from the
communication aspects we can model both separately.
Our approach is motivated by the fact that any kind of global applica-
tion will require the design and implementation of protocols for some forms of
distributed agreement. Although distributed consensus is in general unsolv-
able in asynchronous distributed systems [13,16], certain environments may
be amenable to assumptions of partial synchrony, and it is possible for some
applications to deﬁne a notion of agreement that trades oﬀ accuracy for per-
formance. This mediates against building any kind of distributed agreement
into the semantics of any language for global applications. Instead we focus
on a language for such applications that provides support for designing and
implementing protocols for distributed agreement. An implementation of any
global agreement protocol will require the ability to deliver messages to diﬀer-
ent sites. The approach of inserting a transaction layer above the transport
layer, as depicted in Fig. 1(b), again raises the problem of complicating a
protocol layer with issues that belong to other layers or other parts of the
software system.
We advocate the approach depicted in Fig. 1(c), where we move the trans-
action layer into the application layer. As before, the transaction layer is
tasked with ensuring global state consistency conditions (e.g., money not be-
ing withdrawn from one account without being deposited into another). The
key change is that the transaction layer is decoupled from the navigation of
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the global environment. By separating this layer from the communication
functionality, we reduce the size of the trusted computing base required for
maintaining global consistency and integrity.
Our approach amounts to a restricted API for changing the logs that repre-
sent the “durable” state of the parties in a distributed system. The restricted
API ensures that we only allow changes that preserve the integrity of the
overall system state. Complementary to this, the parties must be able to
communicate evidence of their state to each other, in such a way that outside
parties cannot interfere and cause the system to enter an inconsistent state.
While this could be looked at as moving the problem from one place to an-
other, we are in fact moving the problem of network communication out of
the transaction system and into the hands of the programmer. This moves
the communication system away from a “one size ﬁts all” solution and allows
the user, who will probably known their own network the best, to decide how
communication will take place. However, we retain the all the correctness
guarantees that would be provided by a transaction system that performed
its own communication.
To formulate our method of removing the need for global consensus we
return to the lqp-calculus, which we have previously proposed as a language
for fault-tolerant global computing [9]. We review this work in Sect. 3. This
calculus extends the pi-calculus with logs, actions that append new log entries
and check the contents of logs. In Sect. 5, we show a way of automatically ex-
tracting a capability passing version of this calculus, the lqcp-calculus, which
only makes local checks. In Sect. 7, we show how we may prove the “correct-
ness” of the capability passing system. Sect. 4 and 6 illustrate our systems by
modelling the two-phase commit protocol.
2 Related Work
In previous work [8] we proposed an extension of Java with capability passing
processes. We discussed a strongly typed calculus as a base for this work but
we did not give a type system, semantics or a correctness result.
Berger and Honda [3] have developed a calculus to model two-phase com-
mit. The calculus we present here is a framework that can be used to model
a range of agreement protocols, of which two-phase commit is one example,
as we have shown in previous work [9]. Numerous process algebras have been
proposed as the foundations of programming languages for network applica-
tions. Most of this work is based on mobile computation and mobile code to
deal with latency and ﬁrewall problems [5,7,14,17,23]. Much of this work has
focused on access control of mobile computation in networks, as well as track-
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ing the trustworthiness of hosts. Our focus is on global agreement aspects of
distributed computing.
In the distributed systems community there is a lot of work on certiﬁcate-
based transactions. These systems tend to use certiﬁcates to prove identity or
authorship, whereas we are proposing the use of certiﬁcates to allow the agree-
ment parts of a protocol to be modelled separately from the communication
aspects.
Previous work has also investigated techniques for the secure transmis-
sion of causal relationships in a distributed system [22,24], and for securing
multicast communications [15,19]. The latter work is largely orthogonal to
the work considered here, and the former work focuses on using authentica-
tion techniques to prevent the forgery of vector clocks that carry causality
information in distributed communications. This is targeted at a lower level
than the work presented here. DeLine and Fahndrick have developed the Vault
programming language, [11] in which it is possible to statically enforce the cor-
rectness of protocols by type checking. The considerations we present here,
of a global network programming language that uses proofs of capability to
run secure state protocols over a potentially insecure communication system,
appears to be novel.
3 The lqp-calculus: Specifying Protocols
The lqp-calculus is based on the asynchronous pi-calculus [18,20], a popular
calculus for reasoning about distributed programming languages. The syntax
of the pi-calculus is shown in Fig. 2(a). Channel names n are globally unique.
In addition to constructs for sending and receiving messages, there are also op-
erations for generating new channel names, for replicating processes (this can
be used to deﬁne recursive processes) and for forming the parallel composition
of processes.
One of the innovations of the lqp-calculus is to organize processes into
process groups; we refer to these process groups as conclaves. A conclave has
the form c{P} where c is the name of a conclave and P is a process. The syntax
forces each process in a network to belong to exactly one conclave. There
is also a structural equivalence rule for distributing conclaves over parallel
composition, c{P1 | P2} ≡ c{P1} | c{P2}. The other structural equivalence
rules are a standard extension of the pi-calculus rules to include conclaves, as
shown in Fig. 3.
The processes inside each conclave are active entities, and they can com-
municate with each other in the standard pi-calculus way. The agreement
aspects of a system are modelled by extending the pi-calculus with a notion
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P ∈ Processes ::= stop | (P1 | P2)
| send v1!v2 | receive v1?v2; P
| new n; P | repeat P
| let 〈x〉 = 〈v〉 in P
v ∈ Value ::= n, a, b, c, . . . | u, v, w, x, y, z . . .
| 〈v1, . . . , vk〉
(a) Syntax of the pi-calculus
P ∈ Processes ::= logawait c{{Q(x)}}; P Query log
| logappend 〈v〉 with rule-name; P Add log entry
N,C,M ∈ Network ::= c{P} Conclave
| c{{L}} Log
| new n; C Scoped name
| (C1 | C2) Composition
L ∈ Log Entry ::= true | Q(v) | (L1 ∧ L2)
Q ∈ Predicate ::= . . .
(b) Extensions for the lqp-calculus
Fig. 2. The lqp-calculus
c{stop} | N ≡ N stop | P ≡ P
N1 | N2 ≡ N2 | N1 P1 | P2 ≡ P2 | P1
(N1 | N2) | N3 ≡ N1 | (N2 | N3) (P1 | P2) | P3 ≡ P1 | (P2 | P3)
new n1; new n2; N ≡ new n2; new n1; N new n1; new n2; P ≡ new n2; new n1; P
new n; N ≡ N, n /∈ fn(N) new n; P ≡ P, n /∈ fn(P )
c{new n; P} ≡ new n; c{P}, n = c c{P1 | P2} ≡ c{P1} | c{P2}
true ∧ L ≡ L L1 ∧ L2 ≡ L2 ∧ L1 (L1 ∧ L2) ∧ L3 ≡ L1 ∧ (L2 ∧ L3)
(new n; N1) | N2 ≡ new n; (N1 | N2), n /∈ fn(N2)
(new n; P1) | P2 ≡ new n; (P1 | P2), n /∈ fn(P2)
repeat P ≡ P | repeat P
Fig. 3. Equivalence Rules for the lqp-calculus
of logs. These logs are used to explicate the communication requirements
of protocols, such as atomic commitment protocols, without committing to
how protocol messages should be delivered in global computing environments.
Each conclave c has a single log, of the form c{{L}}, where L is a collection of
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(c1{send n!v1} | c2{receive n?v2; P}) −→ c2{{v1/v2}P} (Com)
E[·] ::= [ · ] | E[· | N ] | new n; E[·]
N ≡ E[N ′] N ′ −→ M ′ M ≡ E[N ]
N −→ M (Cong)
(a) The Base Semantics
c{logawait c0{{Q(x)}}; P} | c0{{L ∧Q(v)}} −→
c{{v/x}P} | c0{{L ∧Q(v)}}
(LogAwait)
(c{{L}} | N), c |= (v) rule-name−−−−−→ Q(v0)
c{logappend 〈v〉 with rule-name; P} | c{{L}} | N −→
c{P} | c{{L ∧Q(v0)}} | N
(LogAppend)
(b) Non-Capability Passing Semantics
Fig. 4. The lqp-calculus
log entries. A log entry has the form Q(v), denoting a log entry asserting the
property Q concerning the value v.
The lqp-calculus semantics are given in Fig. 4. The two constructs that
allow interaction with logs are logawait and logappend. The logawait construct
blocks until a log entry for the conclave name and predicate symbol is in the
stable storage represented by the logs.
The logappend construct is used by a conclave to add new log entries to
its own log. It in turn uses one of a collection of named log rewrite rules.
These rules deﬁne the behaviour of the protocol being modelled, so we will
use diﬀerent sets of rewrite rules for diﬀerent protocols. A log rewrite rule
can check for the presence of log entries in any conclave. However, it can
only check for the absence of entries in its own log. An example of such a
log rewrite rule might check that a conclave is not already aborted before it
commits. The rule for logappend given in Fig. 4 is used when a conclave c,
which has the log L, uses the logappend action with the log rewrite rule called
rule− name. The log rewrite rule takes the parameters v and states that the
predicate Q(v0) should be added to the log. Each log rewrite rule requires
some preconditions and adds a log entry to the local log. These rules are
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speciﬁed using judgments of the form:
N, c |= (v) rule-name−−−−−→ Q(v0)
where rule-name is the name of the rule. The context N must contain the log
of the conclave c, and may in addition contain the logs of remote conclaves.
The vector contains v are parameters for the log rewrite rule (the name of the
administrator conclave, for instance). Finally, Q(v0) is the log entry to be add
by the rule.
For some sets of log rewrite rules the logappend and logawait may be the
only actions that are needed in order to model a protocol. But in the most
general case the use of the send and receive actions together with the log
actions allows a network to behave in a much more varied way. Previous
work on this calculus [9] provides primitives to create new conclaves and logs.
Although these operations add to the expressiveness of the calculus they would
not contribute to the description of capability passing processes, so we have
omitted them here.
4 Example: Two-Phase Commit
In this section we give a concrete example of the lqp-calculus by adding log
entries and log rewrite rules for the well known and widely deployed two-phase
commit protocol [4]. There are ﬁve kinds of log entry for two-phase commit:
Q ∈ Predicate ::= Submit | Prepared | Admin | Committed | Aborted
A Submit(c) entry in a conclave log indicates that the conclave is ready
to enter a run of the two-phase commit protocol and uniquely identiﬁes c
as the administrator conclave. The log entry Admin({c1, ..., ck}) in the log
of the administrator conclave records that the conclaves {c1, ..., ck} are the
participants in an execution of the two-phase commit protocol. The choice
of which conclave will act as the administrator depends on the system being
modelled and will perhaps be chosen by a series of pi-calculus communications
between conclaves. When one of the participants has successfully completed
its task it enters the Prepared() state, after doing so it can no longer choose to
abort. If all the participants become Prepared(), the administrator may enter
the Committed() state. This signals to all the other participants that they
may also become Committed(). Alternatively, the administrator may become
Aborted() at any time before it decides to commit, in which case all the other
participants must also abort. The log rewrite rules for two-phase commit are
given in Fig. 5.
To illustrate the mechanisms introduced above, we give an example using
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c{{ε}}, c |= (c0) AtSubmit−−−−−→ Submit(c0) (At Submit)
c{{ε}} |
∏
ck{{Submit(c)}}, c |= (c1, . . . , ck) AtAdmin−−−−−→ Admin(c1, . . . , ck)
(At Admin)
c{{Submit(c0)}} | c0{{Admin(. . . , c, . . . )}}, c |= (c0) AtPrep−−−−→ Prepared(c0)
(At Prep)
L ≡ (L′ ∧ Committed()), (L′ ∧ Prepared( ))
c{{L}}, c |= () AtStAbort−−−−−→ Aborted
(At StAbort)
c{{Admin(c1, . . . , ck)}} |
∏
ck{{Lk ∧ Prepared(c)}}, c |=
(c1, . . . , ck)
AtAdmCmt−−−−−−→ Committed()
(At AdmCmt)
c{{L ∧ Prepared(c0)}} | c0{{L0 ∧ Committed()}}, c |= (c0) AtPartCmt−−−−−−→ Committed()
(At PartCmt)
c{{L ∧ Prepared(c0)}} | c0{{L0 ∧ Aborted()}}, c |= (c0) AtPartAbt−−−−−−→ Aborted()
(At PartAbort)
Fig. 5. Log rewrite rules for 2PC in the lqp-calculus
these log rewrite rules. Fig. 6 shows a network in which three conclaves, cadm ,
c1 and c2, must either all commit or all abort. A conclave has committed
when, and only when, a commit entry has been written to its log. This
reﬂects the fact that sites may fail during runs of protocols, and the state of
a fault tolerant system on restarting is given by the contents of the logs.
Once c1 and c2 enter the prepared-to-commit state, the system has the
form:
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Transi ≡ ci{logappend 〈cadm〉 with AtSubmit ;
logappend 〈cadm〉 with AtPrep;
( logappend 〈cadm〉 with AtPartCmt ; stop
| logappend 〈cadm〉 with AtPartAbt ; stop ) }
Admin Trans ≡ cadm{logappend 〈c1, c2〉 with AtAdmin;
( logappend 〈c1, c2〉 with AtAdmCmt ; stop
| logappend 〈c1, c2〉 with AtStAbort ; stop ) }
System ≡ Admin Trans | Trans1 | Trans2 | cadm{{ε}} | c1{{ε}} | c2{{ε}}
Fig. 6. Simple two-phase commit
System
∗−→ c1{ logappend 〈cadm〉 with AtPartCmt ; stop
| logappend 〈cadm〉 with AtPartAbt ; stop}
| c1{{Submit(cadm) ∧ Prepared(cadm)}}
| c2{ logappend 〈cadm〉 with AtPartCmt ; stop
| logappend 〈cadm〉 with AtPartAbt ; stop}
| c2{{Submit(cadm) ∧ Prepared(cadm)}}
| cadm{ logappend 〈c1, c2〉 with AtAdmCmt ; stop
| logappend 〈c1, c2〉 with AtStAbort ; stop}
| cadm{{Admin((c1, c2))}}
This completes the ﬁrst phase of the protocol. At this point the conclaves
c1 and c2 cannot abort or commit until they are notiﬁed to do so by the
administrator. In the second phase of the protocol, the administrator writes
a log entry signalling that it has decided to commit. The participants c1 and
c2 can then commit, so the system evolves to:
System
∗−→ c1{ logappend 〈cadm〉 with AtPartAbt ; stop}
| c1{{Submit(cadm) ∧ Prepared(cadm) ∧ Committed()}}
| c2{ logappend 〈cadm〉 with AtPartAbt ; stop}
| c2{{Submit(cadm) ∧ Prepared(cadm) ∧ Committed()}}
| cadm{ logappend 〈c1, c2〉 with AtStAbort ; stop}
| cadm{{Admin(c1, c2) ∧ Committed()}}
It would also have been possible for the administrator conclave to abort,
rather than commit. This would then block the rule that c1 and c2 are using
to try to commit, and so force them to abort.
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5 The Capability Passing System: Implementing Pro-
tocols
As discussed in the introduction, in the setting of global computing it is un-
realistic to maintain an environment in which all parties have direct access to
each other’s state. Our answer to this, capability-passing processes, replaces
the automatic querying of the state of a remote site with the exchange of
“proof” objects that are evidence for the capabilities of remote site. Such an
object, which is digitally signed by the conclave that generated it, is eﬀectively
a proof of a log entry of a particular form.
In this section we show how the non-capability passing lqp-calculus can
be developed into a capability passing version, the lqcp-calculus. Any remote
checks required to make a log change are replaced by the requirement for
a certiﬁcate. This means that the protocol actions are now entirely local
and all global communication (including the communication of certiﬁcates) is
modelled by pi-calculus style actions performed by the processes. We extend
our domain of values to include these certiﬁcates:
v ∈ Value ::= n, a, b, c, . . . | x, y, z, w, . . .
| 〈v1, . . . , vk〉 | Sc[Q(v)]
The new kind of value Sc[Q(v)] signiﬁes a “proof” that the conclave c had
the entry Q(v) in its log when this certiﬁcate was signed. As entries cannot
be removed from the logs, any conclave that possesses this certiﬁcate can
conclude that c currently has the entry Q(v) in its log. We do not address the
exact method by which the proof is signed and veriﬁed, we consider this an
orthogonal issue that is widely addressed elsewhere.
The full semantics of the lqcp-claculus is given in Fig. 7. We alter the
logawait and logappend actions and the log rewrite rules so that they only
query local storage. Any remote queries are replaced by a requirement for a
certiﬁcate.
From the user’s point of view logawait performs the single action of querying
a log. However, from the point of view of an implementation there are two very
distinct versions of logawait. Its ﬁrst use is to check the current conclaves local
log. The second is to check the log of a remote conclave. Our implementation
highlights this distinction by having local and global forms of logawait.
A local logawait checks its own log and returns a certiﬁcate as a result.
c{logawait Q(x) as y;P} | c{{L ∧Q(v)}}
−→ c{{v, Sc[Q(v)]/x, y}P | c{{L ∧Q(v)}}
(LogAwait-C)
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(c1{send n!v1} | c2{receive n?v2; P}) −→ c2{{v1/v2}P} (Com)
E[·] ::= [ · ] | E[· | N ] | new n; E[·]
N ≡ E[N ′] N ′ −→ M ′ M ≡ E[N ]
N −→ M (Cong)
(a) The Base Semantics
c{logawait Q(x) as y;P} | c{{L ∧Q(v)}} −→
c{{v, Sc[Q(v)]/x, y}P | c{{L ∧Q(v)}}
(LogAwait-C)
c{logauth c1{{Q(x)}} with Sc1 [Q(v)];P −→ c{{v/x}P} (LogAuth-C)
c{{L}}, v′, c |= (v) rule-name−−−−−→ Q(v0)
c{logappend 〈v〉 with rule-name and 〈v′〉;P} | c{{L}} −→
c{P} | c{{L ∧Q(v0)}}
(LogAppend-C)
(b) Capability Passing Semantics
Fig. 7. The lqcp-calculus
In addition to unblocking when the speciﬁed log entry is found, the variable y
is replaced with a certiﬁcate that shows that the speciﬁed log entry is present.
There is an implicit assumption that conclaves are always honest when
reporting the state of their log. Indeed, this is an assumption made by most
transaction systems. The aim of the protocol is usually to guarantee certain
results in the presence of an outside attacker or the failure of some given sites.
However, if some participants were being dishonest the use of a capability
passing system would help to make them accountable by requiring them to
sign the state information they distribute.
We extend the syntax of the calculus with a logauth action. This performs
a global version of this the logawait action by using a certiﬁcate to query the
state of a remote log.
c{logauth c1{{Q(x)}} with Sc1 [Q(v)];P} −→ c{{v/x}P} (LogAuth-C)
It should be noted that logauth involves a dynamic veriﬁcation of the signed
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proof, i.e., the check that the conclave whose log we wish to check is indeed the
conclave that signed the certiﬁcate and that the certiﬁcate does indeed contain
the required log entry. If this check fails the construct will block indeﬁnitely.
This is similar to the way in which encryption and decryption are handled in
the spi-calculus [1].
The old logappend action passed the surrounding environment to the log
rewrite rule and in doing so gave it direct access to all logs. This is exactly
the kind of global operation that we wish to avoid. The capability passing
(LogAppend-C) rule only accesses the local log. All the global state information
is passed to the log rewrite rules in the form of certiﬁcates (v′ in the following
rule) that prove the required remote capabilities.
c{{L}}, v′, c |= (v) rule-name−−−−−→ Q(v0)
c{logappend 〈v〉 with rule-name and 〈v′〉;P} | c{{L}} −→
c{P} | c{{L ∧Q(v0)}}
(LogAppend-C)
The lqp-calculus uses diﬀerent log rewrite rules for diﬀerent transactions.
To make the transition to the capability passing system complete we give a
general method that can be used to remove the global checks from any log
rewrite rule.
This removal of the remote checks is absolutely key to our approach. It
removes the requirement for the diﬃcult to implement, global querying of state
and gives the application layer processes complete control over the methods
they use to make communications. Hence removing the need for a bloated
trusted computing base.
Recall from Sect. 3, that the preconditions of log rewrite rules can make
three kinds of check. They may check for the presence of an entry in the
local log, they may check for the absence of an entry in the local log or they
may check for the presence of an entry in a remote log. A rewrite rule is
adapted to use capabilities by replacing each remote check by a requirement
for a certiﬁcate proving that whatever was being checked is true. We use the
two-phase commit rewrite rules from the last section to illustrate this method.
The (At Prep) rule is used by a process that is already part of a two-phase
commit transaction and wishes to enter the “prepared to commit” state. The
old version of this rule in Fig. 5 checks the local log to ensure that the conclave
is part of a transaction run and then makes a remote check to make sure
that the conclave that is playing the part of the administrator has added the
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Administrator entry into its own log, including the current transaction as part
of the run. This remote check is replaced by the requirement for a certiﬁcate,
to give the following rule:
c{{Submit(c0)}}, Sc0 [Admin(. . . , c, . . . )] |= (c0) AtPrep−−−−→ Prepared(c0)
(At Prep-C)
The (At Admin) rule is used by the administrator conclave to start its run
of the two-phase commit protocol. The old log rewrite rule takes a vector
of conclave names and checks that each of those conclaves has recorded the
Submit(c) entry in their log, where c is the name of the administrator. So,
to make the capability passing rule, the check that all the participants are
submitted is replaced by the requirement for certiﬁcates from each of the
participants saying that they are submitted:
c{{ε}},
∏
Sck [Submit(c)] |= (c1, . . . , ck) AtAdmin−−−−−→ Admin(c1, . . . , ck)
(At Admin-C)
An important point to note is that the old rewrite rule implied that all
the remote conclaves were checked at the same time whereas, this new rule
only requires possession of all of the certiﬁcates in order for the administrator
to proceed. This greatly adds to the ﬂexibility of the system. For instance,
if some of the transaction participants are mobile devices that may enter and
leave the administrator’s range, the capability passing system will allow the
administrator to pick up the certiﬁcates whenever the participants are in range
and commit as soon as it has them all, rather than waiting, possibly forever,
until all the participants are in range at the same time.
The complete capability passing rewrite rules for two-phase commit are
presented in Fig. 8. The automatic style of rule generation means we can
produce capability passing log rewrite rules from any log rewrite rules in
the lqp-calculus. In other work [9] we present log rewrite rules for closure,
causality and anti-commitment. Using the method outline in this section we
automatically get capability passing log rewrite rules for these systems too.
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c{{ε}} |= (c0) AtSubmit−−−−−→ Submit(c0) (At Submit-C)
c{{ε}},
∏
Sck [Submit(c)] |= (c1, . . . , ck) AtAdmin−−−−−→ Admin(c1, . . . , ck)
(At Admin-C)
c{{Submit(c0)}}, Sc0 [Admin(. . . , c, . . . )] |= (c0) AtPrep−−−−→ Prepared(c0)
(At Prep-C)
L ≡ (L′ ∧ Committed()), (L′ ∧ Prepared( ))
c{{L}} |= () AtStAbort−−−−−→ Aborted
(At StAbort-C)
c{{Admin(c1, . . . , ck)}},
∏
Sck [Lk ∧ Prepared(c)]
|= (c1, . . . , ck) AtAdmCmt−−−−−−→ Committed()
(At AdmCmt-C)
c{{L ∧ Prepared(c0)}}, Sc0 [L0 ∧ Committed()] |= (c0) AtPartCmt−−−−−−→ Committed()
(At PartCmt-C)
c{{L ∧ Prepared(c0)}}, Sc0 [L0 ∧ Aborted()] |= (c0) AtPartAbt−−−−−−→ Aborted()
(At PartAbort-C)
Fig. 8. Log append rules for 2PC in the lqcp-calculus
6 Example: Two-Phase Commit in a Capability Pass-
ing Style
To illustrate capability passing processes we return to the two-phase commit
example from Sect. 4. The capability passing version of the two-phase commit
network is giving in Fig. 9. The core actions of both systems are the same
but the capability passing system queries its logs after each logappend action
and sends proof of its state to the other parties. These proof objects are then
used as evidence in further logappend actions.
Here, for the sake of clarity, we are assuming that the two participants have
direct communication channels to the administrator. In a more interesting
system the certiﬁcates would have to be passed through a series of network
obstacles, such as NAT boxes and ﬁrewalls.
After the c1 conclave records the Submit entry in its log it uses the local
form of logawait to generate a certiﬁcate.
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Transi ≡ ci{logappend 〈cadm〉 with AtSubmit and 〈〉;
logawait Submit(x) as y;
send outchani!y |
receive inchani?z;
logappend 〈cadm〉 with AtPrep and 〈z〉;
logawait Prepared(cadm) as w;
send outchani!w |
receive inchani?z; ( logappend 〈〉 with AtPartCmt and 〈z〉; stop
| logappend 〈〉 with AtPartAbt and 〈z〉; stop ) }
Admin ≡ cadm{receive outchan1?x; receive outchan2?y;
logappend 〈c1, c2〉 with AtAdmin and 〈x, y〉;
logawait Admin(x1, x2) as z;
send inchan1!z | send inchan2!z |
receive outchan1?u; receive outchan2?v;
( logappend 〈〉 with AtAdmCmt and 〈u, v〉;
logawait Committed as w; send inchan1!w | send inchan2!w
| logappend 〈〉 with AtStAbort and 〈〉;
logawait Aborted as w; send inchan1!w | send inchan2!w
System ≡ new inchani; new outchan1; new inchan2; new outchan2;
Admin | Trans1 | Trans2 | cadm{{ε}} | c1{{ε}} | c2{{ε}}
Fig. 9. Simple two-phase commit using proofs
c1{ logawait Submit(x) as y;
send outchan1!y |
receive inchan1?z;
. . . } | c1{{Submit(cadm)}}
−→
c1{ send outchan1!Sc1 [Submit(cadm)]| receive inchan1?z;
. . . } | c1{{Submit(cadm)}}
This certiﬁcate is then sent to the administrator. The other participant, c2,
will do the same. This provides the cadm conclave with the evidence it needs
to declare itself the administrator of this run of two-phase commit, which it
does by adding the Admin(c1, c2) entry to its own log:
cadm{ logappend 〈c1, c2〉 with AtAdmin and 〈Sc1 [Submit(cadm)], Sc2 [Submit(cadm)]〉;
logawait Admin(x1, x2) as z;
send inchan1!z | send inchan2!z |
receive outchan1?u; receive outchan2?v; . . .} | cadm{{ε}}−→
cadm{ logawait Admin(x1, x2) as z;
send inchan1!z | send inchan2!z |
receive outchan1?u; receive outchan2?v; . . .} | cadm{{Admin(c1, c2)}}
This reduction is performed using the (LogAppend-C) semantic rule from
Sect. 5, which in turn makes use of the (At Admin-C) log rewrite rule from
Fig. 8. The log rewrite rule examines the two certiﬁcates and checks that they
do indeed testify that the remote conclaves have submitted to cadm and that
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they have the correct signatures. These checks are made dynamically and if
they fail the process will block. Here the certiﬁcates are correct so the checks
are successful and the conclave continues to reduce. In this simple example,
the pattern of adding a log entry, querying it to get a certiﬁcate and then
distributing the certiﬁcate continues through out the rest of the reduction.
In a more realistic system, only certain certiﬁcates would be sent to certain
conclaves, and each conclave might require diﬀerent communication protocols
to be used. All of which would be modelled by pi-calculus communications
between the conclaves.
Once Trans1 and Trans2 receive the certiﬁcate that proves the cadm con-
clave is in the Admin state, they both use it to enter the prepared state. In
terms of a run of the two-phase commit protocol, the receipt of the administra-
tor’s certiﬁcate allows the participants to verify that the transaction has been
successfully started. The Trans1 and Trans2 conclaves enter the Prepared
state when they have both completed there assigned tasks and are ready to
commit. These two conclaves then generate their own certiﬁcates and send
them to the administrator, which has now reduced to the following:
cadm{ logappend 〈〉 with AtAdmCmt and 〈Sc1 [Prepared(cadm)], Sc2 [Prepared(cadm)]〉;
logawait Committed as w; send inchan1!w | send inchan2!w
| logappend 〈〉 with AtStAbort and 〈〉;
logawait Aborted as w; send inchan1!w | send inchan2!w }
As with the example process from Sect. 4 the administrator has the choice of
whether to commit or abort. As this conclave has Prepared certiﬁcates from
the other two parts of the transaction it can commit. In doing so it blocks the
logappend action that is attempting to abort. A certiﬁcate testifying to this
commitment is then produced and sent to c1 and c2, which use it to commit
and reach the networks ﬁnal state:
System
∗−→ new inchani; new outchan1; new inchan2; new outchan2;
c1{ logappend 〈〉 with AtPartAbt and 〈Scadm[Committed()]〉; }
c1{{Submit(cadm) ∧ Prepared(cadm) ∧ Committed()}}
c2{ logappend 〈〉 with AtPartAbt and 〈Scadm[Committed()]〉; }
c1{{Submit(cadm) ∧ Prepared(cadm) ∧ Committed()}}
cadm{ logappend 〈〉 with AtStAbort and 〈〉;
logawait Aborted as w; send inchan1!w | send inchan2!w }
| cadm{{Admin(c1, c2) ∧ Committed()}}
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The attempts to abort by c1 and c2 block because the certiﬁcate that has
been passed to these actions does not prove the required state for cadm and so
the AtStAbort log rewrite rule cannot be applied.
7 Correctness of Capability Passing Systems
Capability passing processes provide an implementation method for systems
that wish to query the state of remote parties. It is natural to ask: in what
sense is this implementation “correct”? We certainly do not expect a direct re-
lationship between actions of a capability passing process (in the lqcp-calculus)
and those of a non-capability passing process (in the lqp-calculus), as capa-
bility passing processes will perform a variety of actions that are aimed at
passing certiﬁcates between conclaves. Instead we show that properties that
are based solely on logs and are preserved by reduction in the original system
are also preserved in the capability passing system. An example of this kind
of judgment is presented in previous work [9] where we deﬁne a consistency
property on networks that states a range of requirements, such as a log can
not be committed and aborted at the same time.
We start this section by deﬁning supported networks to be networks with
log entries for every certiﬁcate. We then show that log alterations in capability
passing, supported networks can be mimicked by similar reductions in non-
capability passing networks. Next we formally deﬁne what it means for a
judgement to be based solely on the logs of a network and ﬁnally we prove the
judgement correspondence result.
Deﬁnition 7.1 A network is supported in the lqcp-calculus, if there exists
a log entry for every certiﬁcate, i.e., sup(N) if and only if for all c,Q, v
such that Sc[Q(v)] is a value in N , there exists a context C such that N =
C[c{{. . . , Q(v), . . .}}].
As would be expected, this well-formedness property is preserved by re-
duction:
Lemma 7.2 In the lqcp-calculus, with any set of log rewrite rules, supported
networks reduce to supported networks: if sup(N) and N −→ N ′ then sup(N ′).
Proof The proof is by induction on the reduction from N to N ′. The only
step case is the congruence rule; correctness follows directly from the induction
hypothesis. As log entries cannot be removed, the reduction rules that do not
generate certiﬁcates also follow trivially. This leaves the (LogAwait-C) rule
and as this requires the presence of an actual log entry in order to generate a
certiﬁcate for it, the proof holds.
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The capability passing semantics can only alter logs in the same way as
the non-capability passing semantics. In order to state this formally we deﬁne
logs(N) to be the erasure mapping of any network to just its logs.
Deﬁnition 7.3 For any network N we deﬁne logs(N) by:
logs(N1 | N2) = logs(N1) | logs(N2) logs(new n;N) = new n; logs(N)
logs(c{P}) = c{stop} logs(c{{L}}) = c{{L}}
We note that for any lqp-calculus or lqcp-calculus network, the logs of that
network are a valid network term for both calculi. Next we show that any log
change that can be made by the capability passing, lqcp-calculus can also be
made by the non-capability passing, lqp-calculus.
Lemma 7.4 Assume we have a set of lqp-calculus rewrite rules and their lqcp-
calculus versions, and a supported capability passing lqcp-calculus network N
such that N −→ N ′ using the lqcp-calculus rewrite rules.
It follows that there exists a non-capability passing lqp-calculus network M ,
which does not contain any logs and new a1, ..., an;NL ≡ logs(N) such that
new a1, ..., an; (NL | M) −→ M ′ using only the non-capability passing seman-
tics and logs(N ′) ≡ logs(M ′).
Proof If the reduction from N to N ′ does not alter any logs our lemma
is trivially true, with M = c{stop}. That leaves reductions made using the
congruence and (LogAppend-C) rules. For this type of reduction to be made
we must have:
N ≡ new a1, ..., an; (c{logappend 〈v〉 with rule-name and 〈certs〉; P} | N1)
for some a1, ..., an, v, P,N1 and where c is the conclave whose log has been
extended and rule-name is the log rewrite rule used to make the alteration in
the network N .
The network N is a supported network, so we know that actual log entries
exist for each certiﬁcate. M is inside the binders for any bound names that
may occur in the log and therefore has access to them. Any logappend action
that could be made using a capability passing log rewrite rule could also
be made by the original log rewrite rule, using the non-capability passing
semantics. Hence we set
M = c{logappend 〈v〉 with rule-name; P}

This theorem analogous to saying that, when using the capability passing
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lqcp-calculus, an attacker cannot force us to make a change in our logs that
is not also possible in the non-capability passing process with its perfect com-
munication. Hence, if it is possible for an attacker to aﬀect a system it has
nothing to do with using a capability passing style.
The kind of judgments we are interested in are those based solely on logs.
We formally deﬁne this class of properties as follows:
Deﬁnition 7.5 A judgment on networks 	 in either the lqp-calculus or the
lqcp-calculus is based solely on logs if:
(1) 	 logs(N) if and only if 	 N
and (2) 	 N and N ≡ M implies 	 M
We can now prove our main result, that a judgment based on logs that is
preserved by reduction in the non-capability passing calculus is also preserved
by reduction on supported networks in the capability passing calculus:
Theorem 7.6 Any judgment 	 that is based solely on logs and is preserved
by reduction in the non-capability passing lqp-calculus, with a given set of log
rewrite rules, is also preserved by reduction in the lqcp-calculus, using the
capability passing versions of the log rewrite rules.
Proof Assume we have a lqcp-calculus process N such that 	 N and
N → N ′. By Lemma 7.4, we know that logs(N) ≡ new a1, ..., an;NL and that
there exists a non-capability passing network M , which does not contain any
logs, such that new a1, ..., an; (M | NL) −→ M ′ and logs(N ′) = logs(M ′). We
may then make the following deductions:
	 N by assumption
	 logs(N) by the deﬁnition of 	
	 logs(new a1, ..., an;NL) as logs(new a1, ..., an;NL) ≡ logs(N)
	 logs(new a1, ..., an; (M | NL)) as M does not contain any logs.
	 new a1, ..., an; (M | NL) by the deﬁnition of 	
	 M ′ by preservation of 	 in the lqp-calculus
	 logs(M ′) by the deﬁnition of 	
	 logs(N ′) as logs(N ′) = logs(M ′)
	 N ′ by the deﬁnition of 	

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8 Conclusions
Our approach to implementing global agreement for distributed protocols is
based on a notion of digitally signed “proofs of capability” transmitted be-
tween network sites. This approach has the beneﬁt of moving a large part of
the implementation of the atomic commitment protocol outside of the trusted
computing base. In particular, none of the primitive operations of the protocol
predeﬁne the way in which communications are made. This choice is instead
left to the application while the system ensures the correct execution of the
protocol.
This paper does not consider the privacy aspects of conclaves giving out
signed proofs of their current state. Encrypting the certiﬁcates would protect
this information. To avoid pushing this into the protocol layer a typed versions
of these proofs could be transmitted safely over insecure networks using cryp-
tographic types [12]. Other further work would be to implement a capability
passing transaction system as an extension of an already existing package,
Maftia [21] and the Java based Jini system [2] are possibilities. It may also be
interesting to develop a formal logic with which to specify the preconditions
of the non-capability passing log rewrite rules and a formal mapping of these
rules into their capability passing counterparts.
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